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NOTE
NEW APPROACHES TO THE CIVIL DISABILITIES
OF EX-OFFENDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
When a person breaks the law and is convicted, he is pun-
ished by deprivation of many of the liberties and opportunities
to which he has become accustomed while living as a free man.
The most immediately oppressive of these deprivations is in-
carceration. The walls of the penitentiary narrowly prescribe
the area within which he is able to move. Eventually, however,
he is freed, and he may once again walk about, for the most
part as he pleases. But he is not completely free-not as he
was before. He finds that the state continues to restrict his
freedom in many ways which do not affect his fellow citizens.
These restrictions prevent him from participating in his gov-
ernment and prohibit his entrance into a large number of em-
ployment opportunities. Moreover, these restrictions usually
are not limited in time; they are for life.
Collateral civil disabilities resulting from criminal convic-
tion began in the ancient world and have taken many forms
over the centuries. Today, the disabilities that most affect the
ex-offender are automatic disqualification from a growing
number of occupations, disenfranchisement, and exclusion
from public office.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the fourteenth amend-
ment does not protect the voting rights of felons from state
discrimination.' However, the protections of the fourteenth
amendment are applicable to other discriminatory measures
which burden the ex-offender. Due process and equal protec-
tion arguments can be utilized to overcome the blanket dis-
qualification of all ex-offenders from certain occupations, and
they can provide a base from which to attack statutes which
exclude ex-offenders from public office. It would be far better,
though, if the various legislative bodies would undertake to
weigh the imagined benefits of civil disabilities against the
I Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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harm which such disabilities promote, and then set out to bal-
ance the scales by narrowly limiting the disabling statutes.
IX. BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL DISABILITIES FOR CONVICTION OF
CRIME
The earliest examples of civil disabilities imposed for
criminal wrongs can be found in the Greek and Roman civiliza-
tions. Early in their history, the Romans developed the practice
of declaring as sacer (a state of outlawry) those convicted of
serious crimes.2 This particular disability was severe, and in-
cluded loss of possessions, destruction of family rights, and the
possibility of being slain with no legal sanctions to burden one's
slayer.3 For lesser crimes the Romans imposed a less severe
disability, infamia, which was borrowed from the Athenian
concept of infamy. In Athens, to be "infamous" meant loss of
the rights to attend assemblies, to vote, to make speeches, to
hold public office, to serve in the army, and to appear in court.
4
Given the nature of the Athenian democracy, the possession of
these rights was highly valued, and their loss was a great pe.-
alty.5 The Romans, who shared the Greeks' high regard for
citizenship rights, extended the disabilities even further. In the
2 Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A
Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347, 350 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Damaskal.
I This practice was also followed by the early Germanic tribes. Id. at 351. In
Milan, as late as 1216, one could kill an outlawed person with impunity. However, by
1425, such an act was subject to a 20 lira fine in Rome. In 1531 a person who
sheltered an outlawed relative in Venice could be banished. J. BRISSAUD, HISTORY OF
FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 883 n.3 (1912).
Damaska, supra note 2, at 351.
Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 929, 942 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Special Project].
The electorate in Athens was a thoroughly democractic group in that it included
country gentlemen, businessmen, craftsmen, farmers, and day laborers. But when
Pericles declared that Athenian government was "in the hands, not of the few, but of
the many," his idea of "many" differed greatly from that of more modem thinkers.
Athenian democracy was premised upon the belief that policy should be made by those
with experience and a personal stake in the welfare of the city. Therefore, political
rights were enjoyed only by males over 18 years of age, born of Athenian parents of
the citizen class. Political rights were not enjoyed by women, children, or any of the
thousands of resident aliens who participated in the commercial life of Athens. When
the nearly 100,000 war captives who were enslaved are taken into consideration, one
finds that the number of Athenians who enjoyed political rights was only about one
out of ten. W. AGARD, WHAT DEMOCRACY MEANT TO THE GREEKS 69-70 (1940).
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
later stages of the Empire there appeared specific disqualifica-
tions similar to modem disabilities, such as forfeiture of the
right to carry on a trade.6 The influence of these civilizations
insured that variations of these schemes would appear in devel-
oping societies throughout Europe.7
In Britain, outlawry gained currency before the Norman
Conquest.' The power to declare an individual an outlaw origi-
nally resided in the monarch, but was restricted by the Magna
Charta to a judgment of one's peers or to the law of the land2
Outlawry involved the usual forfeiture of possessions, and any
subject had not only the right, but the duty, to kill an outlawed
criminal.' 0 By the 14th century the latter provision had
been ameliorated to the extent that only the sheriff held the
homicidal prerogative, although a private subject who was at-
tempting to make a lawful arrest of an outlaw could not be held
responsible if he killed the outlaw in the process." In practice,
outlawry lapsed into disuse during the Middle Ages.' 2
Outlawry was replaced in Britain by the penal sanction of
attainder. Upon conviction and judgment of death, or upon
flight in a capital case, the accused was called "attaint,
attinctus, stained, or blackened."13 The consequences of attain-
der were forfeiture of property, corruption of blood, and loss of
civil rights. 4
All real interests of the attainted person escheated to the
king in cases of high treason and felony.' 5 The rationale for the
forfeiture was given by Blackstone:
[H]e who hath thus violated the fundamental principles of
government, and broken his part of the original contract be-
tween king and people hath abandoned his connections with
society, and hath no longer any right to those advantages
Damaska, supra note 2, at 351.
Id.




12 Id. Outlawry was not officially abolished until 1938, with the Administration of
Justice Act. Id.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380.
" Special Project, supra note 5, at 943. See Avery v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148 (N.Y.
1888).
11 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *381.
[Vol. 64
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which before belonged to him purely as a member of the
community. 6
In addition, it was felt that the drastic effect of forfeiture, on
the prospective criminal as well as his posterity, would act as
a powerful deterrent. 7
Forfeiture of personal property occurred in cases of lesser
crimes, such as petit larceny and petit treason, for which forfei-
ture of real property was not exacted.' 8 Upon his conviction the
criminal's personal property was forfeited to the king for a year
and a day with the right of waste, and then to the lord of the
fee. 
19
Corruption of blood involved the power to participate in
the transfer of property by descent. Thus, an attainted crimi-
nal could not inherit from his ancestors, retain that which he
had already inherited, or transmit property to his heirs by de-
scent .2 Furthermore, the heirs of one who was attainted could
not inherit through him from a more remote ancestor.
2'
Forfeiture and corruption of blood were not, however, as
harsh in practice as in theory. The escheat to the king or lord
was dependent upon the exercise of the right, so that many
attainted criminals did in fact own property and participate in
the transfer of property by inheritance, though always subject
to the superior right of sovereign or lord.Y
The third aspect of attainder was the loss of civil rights
known as civil death or civiliter mortuus. 23 One who was civilly
dead could not bring an action, act as a witness in a proceeding,
or "perform any legal function.214 Further, although a civilly
dead person could not sue, he could be sued, and even though
he could contract, he could not enforce the agreement.2
11 Id. at *382.
I d.
" Id. at *386-87.
' Id. at *384-85.
Id. at *388.
21 Id.
21 Special Project, supra note 5, at 943. Forfeiture and corruption of blood were
abolished in Britain by statute during the 19th century. Id. at 949. See Corruption of
Blood Act of 1814, 54 Geo. 3, c. 145; Act to Abolish Forfeitures for Treason or Felony,
33 & 34 Vict., c. 23 (1870).
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When the British colonists came to North America they
brought with them the concept of attainder and incorporated
it into their legal systems." However, the Federal Constitution
abolished forfeiture and corruption of blood as penalties for
treason, except during the life of the person convicted, 7 and in
the early 19th century the advent of a new philosophy of correc-
tions28 helped further deemphasize the elements of attainder.
Although civil death was never abolished in America, its
reach was far from universal, and several early cases held that
the principles of civil death would not be recognized unless
there was statutory authority to support them.29 The disabling
statutes usually contained very general wording, and often re-
ferred merely to "civil death," without defining that phrase.
Various decisions denied convicts the right to contract," the
right to inherit, 31 and the right to bring a civil suit.32 Only a few
jurisdictions currently have civil death statutes in force,3 and
21 S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION § 16, at 24-25 (1963). It has been
suggested that the policy behind the adoption of civil death in America was the protec-
tion of public security, rather than the punitive effect of the doctrine which was
thought to justify the practice in Britain. Note, The Effect of State Statutes on the
Civil Rights of Convicts, 47 MINN. L. REV. 835, 837 (1962-1963). It is more likely,
however, that the perpetuation of the concept in America was the result of an unques-
tioning adoption of known practices by the colonists, who passed the legacy on to
equally noncritical successors. Special Project, supra note 5, at 950.
27 U.S. CONST. art. M, § 3, See also Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 249 S.W.
798 (Tenn. 1923); Note, The Legal Status of Convicts During and After Incarceration,
37 VA. L. REV. 105, 106 (1951).
" The new philosophy was based on principles of rehabilitation, rather than on
retribution as in the past. Special Project, supra note 5, at 949.
11 Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. 118 (N.Y. 1822). See also Willingham v.
King, 2 So. 851, 853 (Fla. 1887); Bosteder v. Duling, 213 N.W. 809, 812 (Neb. 1927);
Neff v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 107 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ohio 1952); Davis v.
Laning, 19 S.W. 846 (Tex. 1892). This attitude was an outgrowth of more modem
policies in the field of criminal justice. Bosteder v. Duling, supra at 812.
Williams v. Shackleford, 11 S.W. 222 (Mo. 1889).
, In re Donnelly's Estate, 58 P. 61 (Cal. 1899).
32 New v. Smith, 84 P. 1030 (Kan. 1906).
31 Included are: ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.05.070-.080 (1962); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600
(West 1970) (during term of sentence); IDAHO CODE § 18-311 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
222.010 (1959)(during term of sentence); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW §§ 79, 79(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1975-1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 65-
66 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 13-6-1 to -2 (1968); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 23-
48-35 (1967).
These statutes can have extraterritorial effect. It has been held that the New York
civil death statute bars a person serving a life sentence in New Jersey from bringing
suit in New York federal district court. Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 232 F. Supp.
237 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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the effect of such statutes is frequently diluted by their own
self-limiting provisions. 4
However, the fading importance of civil death does not
mean that convicted persons regain complete freedom upon
release from prison. The burden of civil death has been re-
placed by the imposition of an ever-expanding number of spe-
cific disabilities. For example, conviction of certain crimes is
an almost universal bar to the opportunity to vote35 or to hold
public office.3 1 In addition, almost every profession or occupa-
tion that is licensed by the state excludes convicted criminals
by prohibiting their licensure. A convicted felon can assume
with a fair degree of confidence that, from the time of his con-
viction, he will be barred from gainful employment in a host
of areas, ranging from architecture 37 to water-well contracting.38
31 The Oregon civil death statute, ORE. REv. STAT. § 137.240 (Supp. 1974), is a
good example:
(1) Conviction of a felony:
(a) Suspends all the civil and political rights of the person so con-
victed.
(b) Forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, authority or power
during the term or duration of any imprisonment.
But then the statute goes on to make the following exceptions to its own rule:
(2) However, a person convicted of a felony may lawfully exercise all civil
rights during any period of parole or probation or upon final discharge from
imprisonment.
(3) The provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section are not intended
to render a person convicted of a felony incapable of:
(a) Making a will; or
(b) Making a power of attorney; or
(c) Making and acknowledging a sale or conveyance of property; or
(d) Appearing and commencing, maintaining or defending a proceed-
ing for child custody or dissolution of marriage; or
(e) Appearing and maintaining or defending any other cause of action
while imprisoned or on release, if the action was started before the person's
conviction.
(4) Nothing in this section prevents a person convicted of a felony and
imprisoned as a penalty therefore from entering into a civil contract of mar-
riage during the period of imprisonment if in the judgment of the Adminis-
trator of the Corrections Division the marriage would contribute to the per-
son's rehabilitation and the administrator consents to the marriage:
3 E.g., CONN. CONST. amend. VII; IOWA CONST. art. 2, § 5; Ky. CONST. § 145; LA.
CONST. art. 8 § 6; MD. CONST. art. 1, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 7, § 2; Miss. CONsT. art.
12, § 241; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 111.021 (Supp. 1975); NEv. CONsT. art. 2, § 1. -
1 E.g., LA. CONST. art. 8, § 6; Miss. CONST. art. 12, §§ 241, 250; NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 29-112 (1964); NEv. CONST. art. 2, § 1, art. 15, § 3; N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:93-5 (1969);
N.C. CONsT. art. VI, § 8; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 312 (1958).
3' OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 45.14 (1971).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-2610 (Supp. 1974). Restrictions in Kentucky in-
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III. OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITIES
The effect of disabilities imposed by the states upon ex-
offenders is felt most immediately in the area of occupational
regulation. These disabilities limit the ex-felon's job opportuni-
ties and, in the process, can hamper his efforts to improve his
lot in life. They are generally derived from the licensing provi-
sions of statutes which regulate certain occupations, and which
deny the issuance or require the revocation of licenses under
certain conditions. The conditions most burdensome to ex-
felons concern the moral character of the licensee and the licen-
see's conviction of certain types of crime.
39
The statutes which restrict licensure on the basis of con-
viction are divided into three types: (1) Those which exclude
persons convicted of certain specified crimes;" (2) those which
exclude persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpi-
tude;4" and (3) those which exclude persons convicted of felon-
ies.42 In general, the statutes which base restrictions upon the
commission of crimes of moral turpitude do not distinguish
between felonies and misdemeanors.
4 3
clude: Ky. REV. STAT. § 311.570 (1972) (physician) [hereinafter cited as KRS]; KRS
§ 317.590 (barber). But see discussion of Harris v. Board of Barbering, Civil No. C 74-
399 L(A) (W.D.Ky., June 13, 1975), infra part Ell); KRS § 313.130 (dentist); KRS §
314.091 (nurse); KRS § 315.127 (pharmacist); KRS § 316.150 (funeral director); KRS
§ 320.310 (optometrist); KRS § 321.350 (veterinarian); KRS § 322.050 (Supp.
1974)(engineer); KRS § 323.120 (architect); KRS § 325.340 (certified public accoun-
tant); KRS § 326.090 (opthalmic dispenser); KRS § 327.070 (physical therapist); KRS
§ 329.030 (detection of deception examiner); KRS § 330.110 (auctioneer); KRS §
331.080 (holder of license for independent business school); KRS § 334.120 (Supp.
1974) (hearing aid dealer); KRS § 334A.180 (Supp. 1974) (speech pathologist and
audiologist).
It should be noted that the statutes are not consistent, in that some base the
disqualification on conviction of any crime, others base it on conviction of any felony,
and still others base it on conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude.
11 Other requirements often include citizenship, a certain level of education and
passing an examination. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 § 58b (Supp. 1976).
11 E.g., Maine prohibits the issuance of a collection agency license to anyone who
has been convicted of forgery, fraud, obtaining money under false pretenses, embezzle-
ment, extortion, larceny, burglary, breaking and entering, robbery, criminal conspir-
acy to defraud, or bribery. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 575 (Supp. 1973).
" E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1613 (Supp. 1973).
2 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 480.11 (1965). "Felony" is defined as a crime graver than
a misdemeanor, or a crime punishable by death or imprisonment. BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 744 (4th ed. 1968).
13 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1613 (Supp. 1973).
(Vol. 64
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The requirement that a licensee be of good moral character
is usually specifically mentioned in licensing statutes. In addi-
tion, however, it has been held that the character requirement
is implicit in a statute mandating that those who engage in an
occupation be licensed." Statutes which limit licensure to
those of good moral character45 are generally more restrictive of
the ex-offender's rights than statutes which only prohibit the
licensing of felons, because the courts tend to find that convic-
tion of a misdemeanor is evidence of bad character, thereby
denying licensure to misdemeanants as well as to felons, who
are generally held to be of bad moral character per se.
The disqualification of felons from licensed occupations
can be divided into two categories: (1) Disqualification from
professions in which the state's interests are strong and the
need for protection against those of bad moral character is
substantial,46 and (2) disqualification from nonprofessional
occupations in which the state's interests are weaker and the
need for protection against those of bad moral character is less
substantial.17
A. Disqualification from Professional Occupations
1. The Legal Profession
The courts have consistently upheld the exclusion of con-
" Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell, 165 N.E.2d 163, 169, 197 N.Y.S.2d 138,
148 (1959).
11 Character is "[tihe aggregate of the moral qualities which belong to and distin-
guish an individual person; the general result of the one's distinguishing attributes."
BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 294 (4th ed. 1968).
11 E.g., the legal profession. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,
239 (1957).
11 It is undoubtedly true that the photographer must possess skill. But
so must the actor, the baker, the bookbinder, the bookkeeper, the carpenter,
the cook, the editor, the farmer, the goldsmith, the horseshoer, the horticul-
turist, the jeweler, the machinist, the mechanic, the musician, the painter,
the paper-hanger, the plasterer, the printer, the reporter, the silversmith, the
stonecutter, the storekeeper, the tailor, the watchmaker, the wheelwright,
the woodcarver and every other person successfully engaged in a definitely
specialized occupation, be it called a trade, business, an art or a profession.
Yet, who would maintain that the legislature would promote the general
welfare by requiring a mental and moral examination preliminary to permit-
ting individuals to engage in these vocations merely because they involve
knowledge and skill?
State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735-36 (N.C. 1949).
1975]
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victed persons from the legal profession. The rationale for this
policy was stated by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Wall:5
It is laid down in all the books in which the subject is treated,
that a court has power to exercise a summary jurisdiction
over its attorneys to compel them to act honestly towards
their clients, and to punish them by fine and imprisonment
for misconduct and contempts, and, in gross cases of miscon-
duct, to strike their names from the roll. If regularly con-
victed of a felony, an attorney will be struck off the roll as of
course, whatever the felony may be, because he is rendered
infamous. If convicted of a misdemeanor which imports fraud
or dishonesty, the same course will be taken. He will also be
struck off the roll for gross malpractice or dishonesty in his
profession . . . . Where an attorney was convicted of theft,
and the crime was condoned by burning in the hand, he was
nevertheless struck from the roll. "The question is," said
Lord Mansfield, "whether, after the conduct of this man, it
is proper that he should continue a member of a profession
which should stand free from all suspicion . . . . It is not by
way of punishment; but the courts in such cases exercise their
discretion, whether a man whom they have formerly admit-
ted is a proper person to be continued on the roll or not.""
It is hard to find fault with the argument that the legal
profession should "stand free from all suspicion," and that the
courts are correct in encouraging efforts toward that goal. How-
ever, the tool most often used in that pursuit is the requirement
that attorneys be possessed of good moral character. The inter-
pretation of the term "good moral character" has proved both-
ersome in some situations, and the standard it sets gives great
leeway to the courts. For example, in Application of Brooks,",
a conscientious objector who refused to report to a public serv-
ice camp (thereby violating the Selective Service Act)"t was
held not to be of good moral character, and was found unfit to
practice law in the state of Washington. The board of bar
examiners deemed Brooks' refusal to report to the civilian
camp and his acceptance of a prison sentence "unjustifiably
" 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
Id. at 273.
355 P.2d 840 (Wash. 1960).
Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 11, 54 Stat. 894-95. Brooks
had served 22 months of a 3 year sentence. 355 P.2d 840 (Wash. 1960).
[Vol. 64
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defiant of the laws of the United States. '5 2 The Washington
Supreme Court upheld the board's finding on the ground that
the bar examiners had not acted capriciously or arbitrarily in
reaching their decision.5" Establishing its own sense of morality
as a rule of law, the court stated:
A loyal and discerning citizen is aware of his great heritage
of liberty and acknowledges his duty to do his share in pre-
serving it. Without a sense of duty, the applicant does not
measure up to the standard of citizenship rightly expected of
an attorney at law. 4
Similarly, the highest court of Illinois held, in the case of
an attorney whose claim to be a conscientious objector was
rejected by a draft board, that conviction for failure to report
for induction constituted conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. According to the court, the conviction conclusively
required disbarment.5
In Kentucky, attorneys have been disbarred for a variety
of crimes and acts which supposedly indicate bad moral char-
acter. In Commonwealth v. Stump56 a prosecuting attorney was
disbarred for accepting a fee to discontinue a prosecution. Al-
though the act in that case was clearly related to the person's
fitness to practice law, the disqualifying conduct does not al-
ways bear such a distinct relationship to the person's fitness to
practice. An attorney's conviction under the Harrison Anti-
Narcotic Act was held conclusively to require disbarment,
7
and the Court of Appeals held that a person who was convicted
of illegally selling alcoholic beverages could not be allowed to
practice law. 5 As the Court stated:
It is not necessary that the misconduct should be such as
would render him liable to criminal prosecution. If it shows
that he is unfit to discharge the duties of his office, is unvor-
thy of confidence, even though the conduct is outside of his
professional dealings, it is sufficient. If he is not honest, if he
1 Id. at 841.
rId.
Id. at 842.
In re Pontarelli, 66 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ill. 1946).
57 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1933).
Commonwealth v. Porter, 46 S.W.2d 1096 (Ky. 1932).
Underwood v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W. 151 (Ky. 1907).
19751
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is not moral, if he is not of good demeanor, he may be dis-
barred, and should be."
In In re May60 the Court ruled that a person convicted of a
crime should be disbarred, even if he was subsequently restored
to citizenship or pardoned, and even if the statute under which
he was convicted was later repealed." The issue is the morality
of the individual in general, without regard to whether his
immorality has affected the practice of his profession in a par-
ticular instance. The criminal act, in whatever circumstances
and of whatever nature, is taken as indicative of bad character
which, in turn, is taken as indicative of unfitness to practice
law.
The Court of Appeals has not always been consistent, how-
ever. In Ex Parte Tenney,6 2 the Court held that one who served
in the Confederate Army during the Civil War was not thereby
disqualified from the practice of law in Kentucky:63
The insurgent may be as capable, faithful and trustworthy,
in his professional sphere, as if he had never raised an arm
against his country. And we will not go beyond that circle to
inquire into his personal merits or fitness for admittance to
our bar. 4
2. The Medical Profession
The practice of medicine, like the practice of law, is sub-
59 Id.
e0 239 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1951).
1, Id. See also Hughes v. State Bd. of Health, 159 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. 1942); State
Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Breeland, 38 S.E.2d 644 (S.C. 1946).
.2 63 Ky. 351 (1865).
I3 d.
Id. at 353.
The right of revolution is natural, God-given, impressed upon our nature,
written upon hearts by the finger of Omnipotence, therefore inalienable; and
this is the fundamental, controlling idea of our own immortal "Declaration
of Independence."
An attempted but unsuccessful revolution is but a rebellion; a political
offense malum prohibitum, but not malum in se. A successful revolution
results in the organization of a new government, often adds a new member
to the family of nations, received on terms of equality, and given an honora-
ble position; its founders regarded as good and great men, and crowned as
patriots; unsuccessful, they are rebels, subject to condign punishment: still,
every other nation affords them asylum and protection.
Id. at 356 (Williams, J., concurring).
[Vol. 64
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ject to state regulation, and the manner in which a criminal
conviction reflects on one's moral character is important in the
licensure of medical practitioners. The case which established
a state's right to disqualify a convicted person from the prac-
tice of medicine is Hawker v. New York.65 Hawker, who was a
physician, was convicted in 1878 of performing an abortion and
was sentenced to prison for 10 years." In 1893, 15 years after
Hawker's conviction, New York enacted a law making it a
crime for a felon to practice medicine. In 1896 Hawker was
indicted and convicted for illegally practicing medicine. The
United States Supreme Court upheld both the statute and the
conviction."
In Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners," California sus-
pended a physician's license to practice medicine even though
the trial court set aside the physician's conviction and
dismissed the prosecution following discharge of the physician
from probation. The suspension was justified on the ground
that dismissal of the prosecution and restoration of the offender
to his rights could change neither his bad character (as conclu-
sively evidenced by the conviction), nor the fact that he had
been adjudged guilty of a crime.69
B. Disqualification from Non-Professional Occupations
The modern trend of expanding state regulation of the
private sector has increased the number of occupations subject
to licensing requirements. As a result, the statutory occupa-
tional obstacles facing ex-offenders are no longer limited to the
traditional professions. Before the turn of the century, law and
medicine were almost the only occupations which were li-
censed."6 Today, states license not only attorneys, physicians
and surgeons, but also various other occupations ranging from
plumbers to chicken inspectors.71 According to a Labor Depart-
170 U.S. 189 (1898).
' Id. at 190.
'7 Id. at 200.
206 P.2d 1085 (Cal. 1949).
c' Id. at 1088. But see State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Finch, 514
S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1974), where a doctor who had murdered his wife 15 years before was
allowed to take the licensing examination to practice medicine.
70 Special Project, supra note 5, at 1003-04.




ment estimate, the number of professions, skills and trades
which are subject to state regulation and control of entry has
doubled in the last 25 years.72 Many of the regulated occupa-
tions, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, are statutorily
denied to the convicted citizen.73
Likewise, the courts have acknowledged and approved sta-
tutory exclusion of former convicts from regulated occupations
other than the traditional professions. Oliver Wendell Holmes
summed up the stance of the law when he said: "[T]he peti-
tioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman. '7 4 In general, if
the state chooses to regulat an occupation, the courts will
uphold the regulatory scheme, even if it prohibits ex-offenders
from engaging in the regulated occupation, and even if the
regulated occupation is not among those which traditionally
have been felt to involve a substantial state interest.75
Under the guise of protecting the "public health, safety,
welfare, or morals," Maryland denied a license to operate a
taxicab to an applicant who had been convicted of disorderly
conduct. 76 The conviction arose out of the applicant's distri-
bution of socialist papers and material.77 The agency based its
denial of the license on the applicant's record, a psychiatrist's
negative impression, "the marked animosity of the applicant
towards law and order, his lack of cooperation with the police
72 GREENE, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND THE SUPPLY OF NONPROFESSIONAL
MANPOWER (Manpower Research Monograph No. 11, 1969).
13 Note, An Application of the New Equal Protection: Expansion of Convict Prop-
erty Rights, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REV. 294, 321 (1975).
' McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
Occasionally courts have struck down state regulation of activities that were not
felt to involve a valid state interest. See e.g., Dasch v. Jackson, 183 A. 534 (Md. 1936)
(paperhangers); S.S. Kresge Co. v. Couzens, 287 N.W. 427 (Mich. 1939)(cut flower
vendors); State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. 1949)(photographers). The Tennessee
Supreme Court found that a state law regulating watchmaking did not have "any real
tendency" to promote the general welfare or protect public morals, health, or safety,
and was therefore invalid. Livesay v. State Bd. of Examiners in Watchmaking, 322
S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1959). It has also been argued that a particular regulatory scheme
was intended to eliminate competition and to aid exploitation rather than to benefit
the public. State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 859-60 (N.C. 1940). The traditional response
by the courts, however, has been to defer to the legislature on these questions and to
interfere only in cases of clear abuse. Rosenblatt v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 158 P.2d
199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945).
11 Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 204 A.2d 521, 524 (Md. 1964).
77 Id. at 522-23, 524.
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in abating the disorders created by him, and his convictions of
crime." 8 According to the court, this was a sufficient basis
upon which to deny the applicant the privilege of earning a
living by driving a taxicab.
79
Just as conviction of a crime only remotely related to the
legal or medical professions can result in the denial of a license
to practice law or medicine,"' a person can be prohibited from
engaging in a nonprofessional occupation on the basis of a
criminal conviction apparently unrelated to the occupation in
question. The classic example is the case in which a person who
had been convicted of maintaining a house of prostitution
could not obtain a license to sell secondhand goods." In a less
ironic case, a man who had been driving a school bus for 10
years was dismissed from further employment in that position
when it was discovered that he had been convicted of a daytime
breaking and entering 25 years before.
82
In at least one case, conviction of a wife prevented her
husband from obtaining a license.83 In Hora v. San Francisco,
Mr. Hora applied for a license to operate a massage parlor at
the same location where his wife had formerly operated a mas-
sage parlor. His application was denied because the wife had
been convicted of morals violations for keeping a house of ill-
fame, soliciting, and engaging in lewd conduct. The evidence
against the wife was to the effect that the female employees of
her massage parlor believed in satisfied customers, and had put
their customers' satisfaction above the law. According to the
court, if the husband was granted a license to operate at the
same location, the same customers, presumably expecting the
same services, would frequent the massage parlor. Therefore,
denial of the license was held to be reasonable. 4
C. The Constitutional Questions
The police power of the state may be used to protect the
T' Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
I d.
See notes 56-59 and accompanying text, supra.
81 Dorf v. Fielding, 197 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
Thomas v. School Bd., 138 So.2d 658 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
Hora v. San Francisco, 43 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965). But see, Roose-
velt Taxi, Inc. v. Comm'r of Public Safety, 279 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Hora v. San Francisco, 43 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
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lives, health, and property of the citizenry and to preserve good
order and public morals.85 It is this power which allows the
state to regulate trades 6 and professions.87 As the Supreme
Court said in Crowley v. Christenson:"
It is undoubtedly true that it is the right of every citizen of
the United States to pursue any lawful trade or business,
under such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of the
same age, sex and condition. But the possession and enjoy-
ment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions
as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country
essential to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals
of the community.89
Although regulation of certain activities has in some cases
been ruled outside the scope of the police power," it is generally
held that the state has wide discretion concerning the ends to
be achieved and the means used, so long as no specific constitu-
tional protection is violated. 1 Efforts to find violations of spe-
cific constitutional protections have proven unsuccessful in
cases involving the occupational restrictions imposed on ex-
convicts. In Hawker v. New York92 a statute which disqualified
felons from the practice of medicine was attacked as violative
of the constitutional provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws
and bills of attainder. 3 However, the constitutional prohibi-
tions apply only if the statute is penal in nature. 4 Using the
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Matthews, 165 U.S.
421 (1896); Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877).
Schmidlinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S.
183 (1900); Louisville v. Kuhn, 145 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1940).
" Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 192-93 (1898). See also Reynolds v. Walz,
128 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1939); Watson v. State Comm'r of Banking, 223 A.2d 834 (Me.
1966); Schireson v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 28 A.2d 879 (N.J. 1942); State
Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Breeland, 38 S.E.2d 644 (S.C. 1946).
137 U.S. 86 (1890).
Id. at 89.
9 See, e.g., State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. 1949) (photography); Livesay
v. State Bd. of Examiners in Watchmaking, 322 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tenn. 1959) (watch-
making).
g1 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Schmidlinger v. Chi-
cago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900).
92 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
"3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
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standard that a statute is not penal if its purpose is not to
punish but to promote some other legitimate state interest,"5
the United States Supreme Court found that New York did not
seek "to further punish a criminal, but only to protect its citi-
zens from physicians of bad character.""5 As stated by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court when reviewing a similar statute:
Though not an ex post facto law, it is retrospective in so far
as it determines from the past conduct of the party his fitness
for the proposed business. Felons are . . . excluded from ob-
taining such a license, not as an additional punishment, but
because the conviction of a felony is evidence of the unfitness
of such persons as a class; nor can we perceive why such
evidence should be more conclusive of unfitness were the act
done after the passage of the ordinance than if done before. 7
The nonpenal nature of the statutes also removes them from
the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment."
The constitutional provision which has received the most
attention in cases dealing with occupational disqualification of
convicted persons is the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. That a person has, in some sense, a property right
in his occupation was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1889
in Dent v. West Virginia:99
It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United
States to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he
may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed
upon all persons of like age, sex and condition. . . .Here all
vocations are open to every one on like conditions. . . .The
interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the estate acquired in
them, that is, the right to continue their prosecution, is often
of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily
11 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898);
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
1 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898). Justice Harlan, in his dissent,
reached the opposite conclusion. Id. at 200-205.
9' Foster v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 37 P. 763, 765 (Cal. 1894).
' E.g., Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 308 F. Supp. 11, 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
2 129 U.S. 114 (1889). The case involved a prosecution for practicing medicine
without a license. Dent had been practicing medicine for 6 years before the licensing
statute was passed. The Supreme Court ruled that there was no denial of due process.
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taken from them, any more than their real or personal prop-
erty can be thus taken.' 0
The Court went on to explain that any qualifications required
by the state for licensure had to be "appropriate" to the profes-
sion. "It is only when [the qualifications] have no relation to
such calling or profession. . that they can operate to deprive
one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation."'' 1 The "no rela-
tion" language used by the Court would appear to give the
state much room for regulation, but Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners'0 2 puts the requirement squarely within the tradi-
tional rational connection rubric of due process: "A State can
require high standards of qualification, such as good moral
character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an appli-
cant to the bar, but any qualifications must have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law."
0 3
How the rational connection standard relates to occupa-
tional disqualification based upon a criminal conviction was
first dealt with in Hawker v. New York.'"4 In ruling on the
constitutionality of the New York statute which disqualified
felons from the practice of medicine, the Supreme Court held
that a state "may take whatever, according to the experience
of mankind, reasonably tends to prove [character] and make
it a test."'0 5 The Court then went on to say:
"I Id. at 121-22. This principle has been reaffirmed by subsequent cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492
(1959); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952); New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). Justice Douglas has said:
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that man
possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live, to be free,
to own property. The American ideal was stated by Emerson in his essay on
Politics, "A man has a right to be employed, to be trusted, to be loved, to
be revered." It does many men little good to stay alive and free and proper-
tied, if they cannot work. To work means to eat. It also means to live.
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
,o, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
102 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Schware was denied admission to the bar for having used
aliases to obtain work during the Depression, for having been a member of the Com-
munist Party, and because he had been arrested on several occasions. Id. at 234-35.
103 Id. at 239 (emphasis added). See also Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319-20 (1866); Perrine v. Municipal
Court, 488 P.2d 648, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972).
,"' 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
,15 Id. at 195.
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It is not open to doubt that the commission of crime, the
violation of the penal laws of a State, has some relation to the
question of character. It is not, as a rule, the good people who
commit crime. When the legislature declares that whoever
has violated the criminal laws of the State shall be deemed
lacking in good moral character it is not laying down an arbi-
trary or fanciful rule-one having no relation to the subject-
matter, but is only appealing to a well recognized fact of
human experience; and if it may make a violation of criminal
law a test of bad character, what more conclusive evidence
of the fact of such violation can there be than a conviction
duly had in one of the courts of the State? The conviction is,
as between the State and the defendant, an adjudication of
the fact. So if the legislature enacts that one who has been
convicted of crime shall no longer engage in the practice of
medicine, it is simply applying the doctrine of res judicata
and invoking the conclusive adjudication of the fact that the
man has violated the criminal law, and is presumptively,
therefore, a man of such bad character as to render it unsafe
to trust the lives and health of citizens to his care.'
Under this reasoning, conviction of any crime could form
a valid basis for a finding of bad moral character. By flatly
stating that it is not "the good people who commit crime," the
Court dispensed with the need for consideration of the nature
or severity of the crime, the possibility of higher moral motiva-
tion for its commission, or the inadvertence of the convicted
person's actions. The Schware case modified the standard,
however, by requiring that the nature of the offense be taken
into consideration when passing on an ex-offender's charac-
ter.'0 7 The New York Court of Appeals has interpreted this to
require that if the crime of which the applicant was convicted
is not directly related to the character trait required for licen-
sure, the licensing agency must look behind the conviction to
determine the relevance of the applicant's acts and motives. '
Nevertheless, the requirement that the nature of the crime
must be considered when the conviction is used as an indicator
,C5 Id. at 196.
,o 353 U.S. 232, 243 (1957). There was also an indication that the passage of time
since the offense would militate against a finding of bad character. Id. at 239. In
addition, it was noted that arrest without conviction is not evidence of bad character.
Id. at 243 n.12.
"I Koster v. Holz, 148 N.E.2d 287, 171 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1958).
19751
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of an applicant's character did not prevent a federal court from
upholding New York's denial of a boxing license to Muhammad
Ali.0  The denial was based on Ali's conviction for his refusal
to submit to military induction, and the court did not feel that
either Ali's professed moral beliefs or the fact that the convic-
tion was still being appealed made the denial unreasonable. 10
Moreover, some courts have held that the fact of conviction is
sufficient evidence of bad character to justify license revoca-
tion, even though the offender has been pardoned."'
The Supreme Court last dealt with the relationship be-
tween conviction and occupational disqualification in DeVeau
v. Braisted."2 A New York statute prohibiting anyone con-
victed of a felony from serving as an officer in a waterfront
union was challenged as violative of due process. The Court
upheld the disqualification despite the fact that the plaintiff
had been convicted 23 years before the statute was passed.
Important in the Court's decision, however, were the special
circumstances which led to enactment of the questioned legis-
lation. Justice Frankfurter, in his plurality opinion, stated that
proper consideration of the case required that the statute "be
placed in the context of the structure and history of the legisla-
tion."" 3 The statute was passed in response to a "notoriously
serious situation" on the New York and New Jersey water-
fronts. There was widespread corruption and dishonesty in the
unions that dominated waterfront employment. The New York
State Crime Commission, which held extensive investigatory
hearings, found that an important causative factor in the "ap-
palling situation" was the presence of convicted felons in many
influential waterfront positions."' Having noted these factors,
Frankfurter said:
109 Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 308 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The
Commission's denial was later enjoined on equal protection grounds due to the Com-
mission's history of issuing licenses to other convicted felons. Ali v. Division of State
Athletic Comm'n, 316 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
"I Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 308 F. Supp. 11, 16-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
" Hughes v. State Bd. of Health, 159 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. 1942); State Bd. of Dental
Examiners v. Breeland, 38 S.E.2d 644 (S.C. 1946).
112 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
" Id. at 147.
1' Id.
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In disqualifying all convicted felons from union office unless
executive discretion is exercised in their favor, [the statute]
may well be deemed drastic legislation. But in the view of
Congress and the two states involved the situation on the
New York waterfront regarding the presence and influence of
ex-convicts called for drastic action." 5
It is important to note that the plurality opinion considered a
flat ban on the placement of convicted felons in union offices
to be a "drastic" measure." 6 It was only in light of the extraor-
dinary corruption of the waterfront, along with the Commis-
sion's finding that the influence of ex-convicts was an impor-
tant factor in that corruption, that the Court was willing to
approve the legislation. As Frankfurter remarked, the Court
was not going to substitute its judgment for that of Congress
and the legislatures of the two states "regarding the social sur-
gery required by a situation as gangrenous as exposure of the
New York waterfront had revealed.""1
7
Another due process approach which has recently been
used in attacking occupational disqualification of convicted
criminals is the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine."' The
result of a recent series of Supreme Court cases," 9 this doctrine
is applied to situations in which legislation affects an individ-
ual's interest because the individual possesses a particular
characteristic. That is, the characteristic is deemed to be con-
clusively indicative of some quality which is a proper subject
of legislative control. If it is not "necessarily or universally true
in fact" that the characteristic implies the existence or non-
existence of the presumed fact, the irrebuttable presumption
is a violation of due process.' The remedy is either a change
in the statute or a hearing at which the individual is granted
Id. at 157.
"' Accord, Pordum v. Board of Regents, 491 F.2d 1281, 1287, n.14 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974); Carr v. Thompson, 384 F. Supp. 544, 548 (W.D.N.Y.
1974).
"I DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 158 (1960).
"1 See generally Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974).
-' Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); cf.
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
"I Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
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an opportunity to rebut the presumption' 2' and an "individual-
ized determination" is made.
1 2
In the occupational disqualification cases the irrebuttable
presumption is that those convicted of certain types of crimes
are unfit for the regulated occupation. It would seem obvious
that the presumption that all convicted felons, for example, are
unfit for the practice of medicine is not "necessarily or univer-
sally true in fact.' '2 3 Whether the conviction evidences unfit-
ness to practice medicine would depend upon the nature of the
crime. To ignore the nature of the offense and to forego consid-
eration of an individual's possible rehabilitation and present
good character is to presume too much and to deny the individ-
ual an individualized determination.
12 4
The obstacle in the path of this reasoning is the ubiquitous
Hawker v. New York. 25 In that case, which was decided long
before the first stirrings of the irrebuttable presumption doc-
trine, the Supreme Court observed: "Whatever is ordinarily
connected with bad character, or indicative of it, may be pre-
scribed by the legislature as conclusive evidence thereof.'
2 6
The Court further expounded:
It is no answer to say that this test of character is not in all
cases absolutely certain, and that sometimes it works harshly
... . But the legislature has power in cases of this kind to
make a rule of universal application, and no inquiry is per-
missible back of the rule to ascertain whether the fact of
which the rule is made the absolute test does or does not
exist."2
It must, of course, be seriously questioned whether this part of
Hawker is of continuing vitality in light of the recent cases on
irrebuttable presumptions. 121
The final constitutional provision which is relevant to oc-
cupational disqualification is the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The most distinctive aspect of the
" See Note, 87 HARv. L. REV., supra note 118, at 1536.
"2 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645 (1974).
l2 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 645 (1974).
170 U.S. 189 (1898).
121 Id. at 195.
' Id. at 197.
'2 See notes 151-65 and accompanying text, infra.
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equal protection clause is that it has two standards by which
state regulation may be judged. The first is the traditional or
"rational connection" test whereby "[a] statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it."2' This is the test that would be
applied under most circumstances. However, there is the more
exacting "strict scrutiny" test that is triggered when the regu-
lation involves a suspect classification such as race, 3' or when
the regulation touches upon a fundamental right.'' In order for
a state classification to pass muster under the strict scrutiny
test, it must be "necessary to promote a compelling state inter-
est."' 2 In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state
regulation subject to strict scrutiny must be "tailored" with
"precision" in terms of accomplishing the state purpose.133 Fur-
ther, if the state has a reasonable alternative to the regulation,
which places a "lesser burden on constitutionally protected
activity,"' 34 then the state must employ the "less drastic
means"'35 to accomplish its purpose.
Obviously, when one attacks a statute's constitutionality
on equal protection grounds, it is highly desirable to have the
statute examined under the strict scrutiny test. Most statutory
occupational disabilities are phrased in such broad language
that they could not be deemed to be "tailored" with "preci-
sion"'36 in pursuing the state goal of protecting the public from
those of bad character. Furthermore, an individual evaluation
of each applicant would be a "less drastic means"'37 of deter-
mining character that would place a "lesser burden on consti-
'1 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
"' [W]here fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). See also Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972); Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,
626 (1969).
22 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
' Id. at 632.
'u Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
' Id., quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
'u Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
"' Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972), quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364




It does not appear, however, that the stricter standard of
review is available to the ex-offender who is seeking an occupa-
tional license. Ex-convicts have never been regarded as a "sus-
pect class,"'39 nor has the right to engage in any particular
occupation been deemed "fundamental" under the equal pro-
tection clause.' This does not mean, however, that occupa-
tional disqualifications based on conviction of crime are im-
mune from equal protection attack; they must still bear a ra-
tional connection to a legitimate state goal.'4 ' In Butts v.
Nichols' a federal court stated the proposition in this manner:
"The relevant inquiry should focus upon whether the means
utilized to carry out a legislative purpose substantially further
that end." '
Butts involved an Iowa statute which barred convicted
felons from civil service employment. The plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the statute was an unconstitutional violation
of equal protection, and requested that its enforcement be en-
joined. The court discerned the state interest involved to be
protection of the "public trust."'4 After noting that the prohi-
bition was an across-the-board ban on employment of felons,
the court held:
Section 365.17 (5) suffers from a total lack of ... narrowing
criteria. As a result, the statute is both over and under inclu-
sive: persons who clearly could serve the public interest are
denied civil service jobs, while misdemeanants convicted of
crimes indicating a lack of probity suffer no disqualification.
In short, no consideration is given to the nature and serious-
ness of the crime in relation to the job sought. The time
elapsing since the conviction, the degree of the felon's reha-
bilitation, and the circumstances under which the crime was
committed are similarly ignored.'
"I Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
,3' Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1190 (lst Cir. 1970).
1 Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 579 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (three-judge court).
For the view that convicts constitute a "suspect" class and that occupational licensure
should be subject to a strict standard of review, see Note, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. Rav.,
supra note 73, at 338-40.
'" Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
142 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (three-judge court).
,, Id. at 579.
'" Id. at 580.
243 Id. at 581.
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On this basis the court found that the statute did not have a
rational relationship to a legitimate state goal, and was there-
fore violative of equal protection. '46
The equal protection clause may also be used to attack the
actions of the licensing agency itself, even if the statute under
which the agency operates is held to be constitutionally sound.
In Ali v. Division of State Athletic Commission'47 Muhammad
Ali sued for injunctive relief from the commission's refusal to
issue him a license to box in New York. The commission based
its denial of the license on the fact that Ali had been convicted
of refusing to submit to induction, even though Ali's action had
been prompted by professed religious beliefs and the conviction
was still on appeal. The commission stated that Ali's convic-
tion was "detrimental to the best interests of boxing . ... "
However, on other occasions the commission had issued licen-
ses to boxers who had been convicted of a variety of offenses
including second-degree murder, burglary, armed robbery,
rape, extortion, grand larceny, sodomy, aggravated assault and
battery, embezzlement, arson, fraud, and desertion from the
armed forces.' The court, finding no rational basis for distin-
guishing Ali from these other boxers, declared the commis-
sion's actions unconstitutional and granted an injunction bar-
ring the commission from denying Ali a license.'
A recent case from the federal courts, Harris v. Board of
Barbering,"' is a good example of the vitality of attacks on
statutes which prohibit those convicted of crime from pursuing
certain occupations. It also exemplifies the manner in which
equal protection and due process arguments can complement
and reenforce one another.
Chester Harris was a master barber, licensed in 1958 under
the proper Kentucky regulatory statute.'12 Harris worked as a
barber until 1970, when he was convicted of the sale of narcotic
drugs (a felony) and sentenced to 5 years in prison. A Kentucky
statute required that a barber's license be revoked upon a pro-
" Id. at 581-82.
316 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
14 Id. at 1247.
" Id. at 1249.
', Id. at 1253.
Civil No. C 74-399 L(A)(W.D. Ky., June 13, 1975).
l See KRS § 317.450 et seq.
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per showing that the licensee had been convicted of a felony. 53
Accordingly, the Board of Barbering revoked Harris' license in
1971, while he was in prison. Harris then brought suit in federal
district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to have the statute de-
clared unconstitutional as violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment,'54 and to enjoin its enforcement.
Harris' fourteenth amendment argument included both
due process and equal protection claims. Under the due process
argument, the three-judge court immediately noted that the
flat prohibition against issuance of a license to one who had
been convicted of a felony created an irrebuttable presump-
tion '55 which prevented Harris from practicing his occupa-
tion.'56 Citing the recent Supreme Court cases on irrebuttable
presumptions, 5 7 the court stated:
These permanent, irrebuttable presumptions are held to be
unconstitutional as violations of the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution, because they deny the right to the person
affected by the statute to have an individualized
determination made as to his rights.'58
, ' KRS § 317.590(1)(a).
'' Harris also attacked the statute under the eighth amendment prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment. Memorandum for Plaintiff at 3, Harris v. Bd. of Bar-
bering, Civil No. C 74-399 L(A) (W.D. Ky., June 13, 1975). The court, however, did
not address itself to this issue.
' See notes 118-28 and accompanying text, supra.
'' The court stated that the presumption was that Harris was "forever enjoined
and prohibited from pursuing his livelihood as a barber." Harris v. Bd. of Barbering,
Civil No. C 74-399 L(A) at 2 (W.D. Ky., June 13, 1975). Plaintiff's counsel stated the
position more precisely when he said that the presumption went to Harris' "unfitness"
to practice barbering. Memorandum for Plaintiff at 2, Harris v. Bd. of Barbering, Civil
No. C 74-399 L(A) (W.D. Ky., June 13, 1975). The statute did not presume that a felon
was prohibited from being licensed. The statute presumed that a felon was unfit to be
licensed and, therefore, prohibited the license from being issued. The defendant's
argument that the statute was not a violation of due process was to the effect that good
moral character is a proper and valid requirement for the licensure of barbers and that
conviction of crime is conclusive proof of bad moral character. Memorandum for De-
fendant at 18, Harris v. Bd. of Barbering, Civil No. C 74-399 L(A) (W.D. Ky., June
13, 1975). Counsel for plaintiff was quick to point out that this argument showed
precisely why the statute was unconstitutional since it relied on an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that a felon does not have good moral character. Reply Memorandum for
Plaintiff at 1, Harris v. Bd. of Barbering, Civil No. C 74-399 L(A) (W.D. Ky., June
13, 1975).
,"I Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973).
'I" Harris v. Bd. of Barbering, Civil No. C 74-399 L(A) at 2 (W.D. Ky., June 13,
1975) (emphasis added).
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In this case the statute prevented Harris from working as a
barber, on the presumption that he was unfit, without giving
him an opportunity to prove otherwise. Therefore, the statute
was held unconstitutional.
The court continued a due process analysis, and examined
the statute with reference to the requirement that any state-
imposed qualification for engaging in an occupation have a
rational connection with an applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice the occupation. 59 The court found at least two reasons
why the statute's across-the-board disqualification of felons
did not bear a rational connection to the fitness of barbers.
First, the court found that many of the crimes which Kentucky
classifies as felonies bear little or no relationship to one's suita-
bility for being a barber."' Second, the court stated:
[The statute] gives no consideration to the nature and seri-
ousness of the crime in relation to the job sought or the time
elapsing since the conviction, the degree of the felon's reha-
bilitation, and the circumstances under which the crime was
committed. 1'
The court also found the statute unconstitutional under
the rational connection standard of the equal protection clause.
The court held that although a state "could logically prohibit
and refuse employment in certain positions where the felony
conviction would directly reflect on the felon's qualification,"
16 2
this particular statute was not tailored in such a fashion as to
insure that the felony conviction did, in fact, reflect on the
felon's qualifications. There are felonies which are not relevant
to barbering, and there are misdemeanors which are relevant,
yet the statute includes any felony conviction as an automatic
disqualification, while no misdemeanor conviction is included.
'' Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
' "We note as some examples of such varieties, negligent homicide arising out
of drunken driving, income tax evasion and violation of federal election laws." Harris
v. Bd. of Barbering, Civil No. C 74-399 L(A) at 3 (W.D. Ky., June 13, 1975).
"I Id. Note how this sentence exhibits the close relationship between the tradi-
tional rational connection rubric of due process and the more recent focus on irrebutta-
ble presumptions. The disqualification of felons lacks the requisite rational connection
to a valid state interest because it fails to take into consideration the listed factors
when attempting to determine an applicant's fitness. At the same time, the listed
factors include much of what would be examined in the individualized determination
of the applicant's suitability required by the irrebuttable presumption cases.
"I Id. at 4.
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Thus, the court found the statute in violation of the equal
protection clause as well as the due process clause.16
The court noted that although automatic disqualification
of felons was unconstitutional, the board could still consider
the relation between an applicant's felony conviction and his
moral character, so long as the board conducted an individual-
ized hearing to inquire into the applicant's suitability."' Thus,
the board cannot avoid the holding in Harris simply by trans-
ferring to its own deliberations the automatic disqualification
of felons. A felony conviction may be considered by the licens-
ing agency only within the context of an individualized hearing
on the question of the applicant's fitness.
The court went on to suggest the aspects of a conviction
which should be considered by the licensing agency when mak-
ing the required individualized determination on an appli-
cant's request for a license: 1) The nature and seriousness of
the crime; 2) the time elapsed since conviction; 3) the degree
of rehabilitation; and 4) the circumstances under which the
'" Id. The court also mentioned another irrational aspect of Kentucky's licensing
scheme: Only crimes of moral turpitude or dishonesty, and not all felonies, are the
basis for automatic denial of licensure to physicians, osteopaths, dentists, chiroprac-
tors or attorneys.
Obviously, the activities of persons in those professions have a much more
substantial impact on the welfare of members of the public who utilize their
services than do the activities of a barber, since in many instances, the
liberty, property rights, good health or even the lives of persons dealing with
them are intimately involved and affected by their capabilities. Yet there is
no statute which requires immediate and permanent revocation of a license
of the members of any of these professions simply on the basis of conviction
of any felony.
Id.
In its defense the Board of Barbering relied heavily on Hawker v. New York, 170
U.S. 189 (1898), see notes 65-67 and 92-96, and accompanying text, supra. However,
the court was of the opinion that although Hawker has never been overruled, it no
longer has vitality. This conclusion was based on a review of the cases that followed
Hawker, including Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), which
required that the nature of an offense be investigated before placing reliance on it as
an indicator of an applicant's character. The court also noted that the Supreme Court
had not seen fit to discuss Hawker in the cases striking down irrebuttable presump-
tions. See notes 118-28 and accompanying text, supra. Taking these considerations
together, the court concluded that Hawker had in effect been repudiated, and was no
longer controlling. Harris v. Bd. of Barbering, Civil No. C 74-399 L(A) at 5 (W.D. Ky.,
June 13, 1975).
Harris implies that other statutes (see note 37 supra) which automatically disqual-
ify those convicted of crime may likewise be invalid.
184 Id. at 5, 6.
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crime was committed.'65 Requiring consideration of these fac-
tors in a hearing on an individual's fitness could effectively
neutralize the adverse effects of a conviction and would at
least give the ex-offender a chance to have the issue of his
fitness determined on the merits of his case.
IV. DISENFRANCHISEMENT
A. Historical Development
Disqualification of convicted citizens from exercise of the
franchise has recently received judicial attention. 6 ' The disen-
franchisement of felons developed early in American history,
when voting was a privilege usually extended only to those who
were fortunate enough to be white, male, wealthy and Chris-
tian.'67 As one author understated the point: "The right of
widespread popular political participation does not 'share in
the glorious history of other democratic values.' ""6
Traditionally, voting was viewed as a mere privilege, or at
most a political right, created by and within the control of the
states.6 9 In the words of the Supreme Court, "the Constitution
of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon
any one."170 Thus, there could be no constitutional challenge to
restrictions imposed on the right to vote, unless the restriction
violated some other constitutionally protected right. 7 ' This
view prevailed for 180 years, until the Supreme Court altered
its approach in Baker v. Carr."'
In Baker, the Court applied the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the area of voting rights, and
' Id. at 3.
2eS See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
"1 See generally Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement
Laws, 83 YALE L.J. 580, 584 (1974); Special Project, supra note 5, at 974; Le Clercq,
The Emerging Federally Secured Right of Political Participation, 8 IND. L. REV. 607,
608 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Le Clercq].
"' Le Clercq at 608 quoting Gangemi v. Rosengard, 207 A.2d 665, 666 (1965).
' See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 4.
'0 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874)(emphasis added).
"' Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 449 (2d Cir. 1967) held that disen-
franchisement was nonpenal, and therefore the eighth amendment was inapplicable.
On the question of whether disenfrancisement is contrary to other provisions of the
Constitution, see Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Cruelly Excessive
Punishment, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 124 (1975).
172 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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held that malapportioned legislative districts violated the
equal protection of voters. The application of the fourteenth
amendment to the electoral process signaled recognition of the
franchise as a federally protected right rather than as a mere
state-provided privilege.' The metamorphosis of the right to
vote from nonprotected privilege to protected right was appar-
ent in other Supreme Court cases as well. For instance, in
another reapportionment case the Supreme Court remarked:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any al-
leged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.'
74
The Court's efforts to protect voting rights have not been
limited to reapportionment cases. In 1965 the Supreme Court
stated that the right to vote is so "vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions' ' 75 that states could not be permitted
to exclude from the state elective process persons moving into
the state while on military duty. 7' In 1970, the Court held that
a state could not deny the right to vote in state elections to
persons living on a federal reservation. 77 In a 1973 case the
Court ruled that statutes which establish unreasonably long
periods during which a voter may not change party affiliation
are unconstitutional.'
78
The Supreme Court's handling of state laws which condi-
tioned the right to vote upon ownership of real property pres-
ents yet another contrast to the traditional view of voting as a
privilege. For instance, in Kramer v. Union Free School
District,7 the state of New York made a distinction between
" See generally Le Clercq, supra note 167, at 617-18. Compare Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962) with Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
"' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
115 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939).
,, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
"' Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
"' Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). Cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974)
and Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
"7 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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persons who owned taxable property and those who did not."18
New York argued that it had a legitimate interest in preventing
those who were not "directly affected" from participating in
the school district election.18 ' The Supreme Court, "carefully
and meticulously '18 2 scrutinizing the statute, held it invalid.
According to the Court:
Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective
basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any
effective voice in the governmental affairs which substan-
tially affect their lives. Therefore, if a challenged state stat-
ute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of
requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to oth-
ers, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are
necessary to promote a compelling state interest.'3
Despite the Supreme Court's recognition of voting as a
fundamental right meriting application of the strict scrutiny
standard of equal protection, one group-felons-has consis-
tently failed to benefit by the change in judicial outlook.' The
disenfranchisement of felons is the rule, not the exception; 28
states, including Kentucky, disenfranchise felons.'8 '
Although the statutes which disenfranchise felons can be
accounted for as anachronisms lacking a rational basis,'86 the
courts often mention one particular reason for their existence:
the need to preserve "the purity of the ballot box."' 87 In the
words of the Alabama Supreme Court:
,91 Id. Actually, persons with school age children were allowed to vote regardless
of whether they owned property.
191 Id.
' Id. at 626.
I" Id. at 626-27.
,1 See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). See also Special Project,
supra note 5, at 974-75 et seq.
'1 Note, 7 Sw. U.L. REV., supra note 171, at 126. Section 145 of the Kentucky
Constitution disenfranchises "[p]ersons convicted in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion of treason, or felony, or bribery in an election, or of such high misdemeanor as
the General Assembly may declare . . . ." In addition, idiots, insane persons, and
persons who are in prison at the time of election are also disqualified. Ky. CONST. §
145. The constitutionality of provisions which disenfranchise those who are in prison
on election day is currently being considered. See, e.g., Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512
(1973) (remanded for further proceedings).
'' Note, 7 Sw. U.L. REV., supra note 171, at 124-25.
W' ashington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884).
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The presumption is, that one rendered infamous by convic-
tion of felony, or other base offense indicative of great moral
turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage, or to
hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen . . . .It is
proper, therefore, that this class should be denied a right, the
exercise of which might sometimes hazard the welfare of com-
munities .... 185
The belief that felons pose a danger to the populace be-
cause of the likelihood that they will abuse the electoral process
in order to further criminal intentions was also expressed in a
leading Supreme Court case, Davis v. Beason."9 A statute of
the Idaho Territory required that each person who sought to
register to vote take an oath stating that he was neither a
bigamist nor a member of any organization which taught, ad-
vised, counseled, or encouraged the commission of bigamy or
polygamy. The statute was intended to deny those of the Mor-
mon faith the right to vote. The defendant took the oath and
registered to vote even though he was a member of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 9 He was later indicted
and convicted of unlawfully registering to vote. The crime
which disqualified him from voting was that of belonging to an
organization which advocated bigamy and polygamy. 9' Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court:
Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws ...of the
United States, and they are crimes by the laws of Idaho. They
tend to destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb
the peace of families, to degrade women and to debase man.
Few crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society
and receive more general or more deserved punishment."9'
Since the Court found that bigamy was a criminal act, and that
advocacy of bigamy was criminal and anti-social, it is not sur-
prising that the Court also found that the statute, which
"exclude[d] from the privilege of voting .. .those who [had]
been convicted of certain offenses, and those who advocate[d]
in Id.
133 U.S. 333 (1890).
, Id. at 334-35. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints is commonly
known as the Mormon Church.
"I Id. at 341. In that Davis v. Beason upholds disqualification of persons who are
deemed criminals, but who have not been convicted, it is an unusual case.
192 Id.
[Vol. 64
1975] CIVIL DISABILITIES OF Ex-OFFENDERS
a practical resistance to the laws ... .,13 was a valid legisla-
tive act.'94 The rationale applied by the Court in Davis, that
disenfranchisement of persons who advocate criminal conduct
is necessary "to prevent persons from being enabled by their
votes to defeat the criminal laws of the country," '95 is still used
to uphold statutes which disenfranchise convicted persons.
In Green v. Board of Elections,"' Green, who had been
convicted of two felonies, sought a judgment declaring him an
eligible voter."' The statute in question provided that no one
convicted of a felony in a federal court of an offense of which
such court has exclusive jurisdiction, shall have the right to
register for a vote in any election unless he shall have been
pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the presi-
dent of the United States.'98
Green alleged'99 that the statute offended the equal protection
clause, as well as the constitutional prohibitions against bills
of attainder 0 and cruel and unusual punishments. 0 ' Applying
the traditional rational connection test of equal protection,0 '
"I Id. at 347.
" Though Davis v. Beason was for 80 years the leading authority on disenfranchi-
sement of convicted citizens, the arguments and the opinion dealt primarily with
freedom of religion. Id. at 344. The Court spoke more of "the holy estate of matrimony;
the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty
of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficient progress in social and
political improvement. " than of disenfranchisement of convicted persons. Id. at
345.
I,, Id. at 348.
"' 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967). Gilbert Green was one of the defendants in the well-
known case of United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
' Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1967).
,9 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 152 (McKinney 1964) as cited in Green v. Board of Elections,
380 F.2d 445, 448 (2d Cir. 1967).
I" Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 449 (2d Cir. 1967). Because the
plaintiff was seeking to convene a three-judge panel to rule on the constitutionality of
the statute, the issue before the court was whether there was any substantial constitu-
tional basis for his allegation.
"" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10 provides, inter alia:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Let-
ters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin as Tender in payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. VIII reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
212 380 F.2d at 451.
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the court held that this discrimination against felons was not
unconstitutional:
The early exclusion of felons from the franchise by many
states could well have rested on Locke's concept, so influen-
tial at the time, that by entering into society every man "au-
thorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislature
thereof, to make laws for him as the public good of the society
shall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance (as
to his own decrees) is due." A man who breaks the laws he
has authorized his agent to make for his own governance
could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right
to participate in further administering the compact. On a less
theoretical plane, it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for
a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not
take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the
executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try
them for further violations, or the judges who are to consider
their cases. This is especially so when account is taken of the
heavy incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of organized
crime.2
0 3
Not all courts, however, were willing to accept the necess-
ity of disenfranchising felons. In Otsuka v. Hite2"4 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court considered a state constitutional provision
similar in effect to the statute which would later be at issue in
Green, and held that the more exacting strict scrutiny standard
of equal protection review should be applied to the disenfran-
chisement of felons. Otsuka involved two individuals who had
been conscientious objectors during World War II. They had
chosen to plead guilty to violations of the Selective Service
Act"°5 rather than do work which they believed was helpful to
the war effort. 06 Decades later, when the two attempted to
register to vote, the registrar of voters refused to register them
because, according to the registrar, they had been convicted of
an infamous crime and were therefore ineligible to vote under
the terms of the California constitution."7 The California Su-
3 Id., quoting An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government 89 (footnote omitted).
204 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
21 Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 11, 54 Stat. 894-95.
206 Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 414-15, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 286-87 (1966).
20, CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1879) provided that "no person convicted of any
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preme Court, observant of the trend evidenced by Baker v.
Carr, 2 8 recognized that article I, section 2 of the United States
Constitution might establish a federal right to vote29 and thus
applied the compelling state interest test to the state constitu-
tional provision. According to the court, disenfranchisement of
felons would have to be reasonably related to a compelling
state interest in order to withstand attack. The court conceded
that prevention of election fraud might be a compelling state
interest, but held that disenfranchisement of felons was not
reasonably related to that interest.
2 10
The holding in Otsuka was contrary to the prevailing case
law, for the Supreme Court had recognized the disenfranchi-
sement of felons in Gray v. Sanders211 and Trop v. Dulles, 21 and
had upheld a similar provision in Davis v. Beason."' The Cali-
fornia court dismissed the language in Gray and Trop which
was favorable to disenfranchisement, stating that it was dicta
which the court was "not compelled to accept as reasoned.
21
The language in Davis,"5 however, was not mere dictum, and
the court had to deal with the holding in Davis that disenfran-
chisement of felons was not violative of equal protection. Con-
sequently, the court avoided the possibility of Supreme Court
review by basing its holding on the definition of the term "infa-
mous crime," clearly a state ground of decision.1 ' According to
the California court, membership in a church which advocated
bigamy constituted an infamous crime, while refusal to report
for induction did not:
... Harlan Fiske Stone, later Chief Justice, drew from the
Nation's past when he declared that "both morals and sound
policy require that the state should not violate the conscience
of the individual. All our history gives confirmation to the
infamous crime ... shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector. . . ... The Califor-
nia constitution has since been amended so as not to disqualify felons from voting.
2- 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
20 Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 415-16, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 287-88 (1966). See
generally Le Clercq, supra note 167.
210 Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 289 (1966).
211 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
212 356 U.S. 86, 89 (1958).
213 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
21" Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 419, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 291 (1966).
215 133 U.S. 333 (1890). See also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
26 Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 419, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 291 (1966).
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view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value
which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the
state. So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the
integrity of man's moral and spiritual nature that nothing
short of the self-preservation of the state should warrant its
violation; and it may well be questioned whether the state
which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the
conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it
by the process." Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 Col.
Univ. Q. 253, 269 (1919).17
In view of the foregoing, it cannot reasonably be said that
plaintiffs' violation of the Selective Service Act branded
them as morally corrupt and dishonest men convicted of an
"infamous crime ' as that phrase is used in article II, section
1, of the California Constitution.
28
B. Richardson v. Ramirez
In 1973 the California Supreme Court once again faced an
attack on the constitutionality of California's felon-
disenfranchisement laws." 9 The case involved three felons,
each of whom had been convicted, served time in jail or prison,
and successfully completed parole. 2 1 When they applied to reg-
ister to vote the registrars refused to allow them to register. The
three filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme
Court of California, invoking that court's original jurisdic-
tion. 21 The petition challenged the constitutionality of their
exclusion from the electoral process on the ground that Califor-
nia's denial of voting rights to felons was a violation of equal
protection. 22 At the time in question the California constitu-
"I Id. at 425, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 297, quoting United States v. Seeger 380 U.S. 163,
169-70 (1965)(footnote omitted).
22 Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 425, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 297 (1966).
21 Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1973), rev'd sub nom.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
21 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 31 (1974). Ramirez had been convicted of
robbery by assault, a felony, in 1952. His parole was terminated in 1962. Respondent
Lee had been convicted of heroin possession in 1955 and completed his parole in 1959.
Respondent Gill had been convicted of second degree burglary and forgery and had
completed his parole. Id. at 32 n.9.
" Id. at 32.
22 Id. at 33. They also alleged that the laws were applied in a geographically non-
uniform manner so as to deprive them of due process of law and "geographical" equal
protection. A report by the California Secretary of State which "concluded that there
was a wide variation in the county election officials' interpretation of the challenged
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tion provided that laws be made to disenfranchise certain citi-
zens, including those convicted of "high crimes,112 3 and also
that:
. . . no alien ineligible to citizenship, no idiot, no insane
person, no person convicted of any infamous crime, no person
hereafter convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation
of public money, and no person who shall not be able to read
the Constitution in the English language and write his or her
name, shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this
state.2'4
The California Elections Code provided that:
The county clerk shall cancel the registration . upon the
production of a certified copy of a subsisting judgment of the
conviction of the person registered of any infamous crime or
of the embezzlement or misappropriation of any public
money .... 22I
In Ramirez v. Brown the California court relied heavily on
the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v.
Blumstein.26 In Dunn the Court outlined three factors which
must be examined in determining whether a law violates the
equal protection clause: (1) The nature of the classification, (2)
the interests of the individual which are affected, and (3) the
state interests which are furthered by the classification." ' The
California court recognized that equal protection analysis had
evolved considerably since disenfranchisement statutes were
first considered by the Supreme Court:2 "In the light of [the]
voting exclusions. . . ." was included with the petition. Id. at 33 (footnote omitted).
"The parties agree that the lack of uniformity is the result of differing interpretations
of the 1966 Supreme Court of California decision in Otsuka v. Hite ... which defined
'infamous crime' as used in the California constitutional provisions." Id. at 33 n.12.
2" CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 11 (1879).
22. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1879).
2 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 383 (West 1961).
2- 405 U.S. 330 (1972). At issue in Dunn was the constitutionality of a durational
residency requirement for voting. Tennessee required residence in the state for 1 year
and in the county for 3 months as prerequisites for voting, though registration books
were closed only 30 days before an election. Tennessee asserted that the residency
requirements were necessary to insure pure elections and knowledgeable voters. The
Supreme Court held that the provisions were not necessary to further a compelling
state interest.
IN Id. at 335.
21 Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1346, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 138, (1973), rev'd
sub nom. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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. . . evolution of the law of equal protection, the analysis in
Otsuka of the constitutionality of disenfranchising persons con-
victed of crime appears no longer adequate. ' 22 The California
court held that the constitutional and statutory provisions
which disenfranchised felons violated equal protection:
For the reasons stated in Dunn, we hold that the enforcement
of modern statutes regulating the voting process and penaliz-
ing its misuse-rather than outright disfranchisement of per-
sons convicted of crime-is today the method of preventing
election fraud which is the least burdensome on the right of
suffrage. It follows that such disfranchisement is not "neces-
sary," within the meaning of Dunn and its predecessors, to
achieve that goal. We conclude that, as applied to all ex-
felons whose terms of incarceration and parole have expired,
the provisions of article II and article XX, section 11, of the
California Constitution denying the right of suffrage to per-
sons convicted of crime, together with the several sections of
the Elections Code implementing that disqualification...
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.20
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
reversed, not on the ground that disenfranchisement of felons
is not a denial of equal protection, but on the ground that
section two of the fourteenth amendment specifically excludes




Section two of the fourteenth amendment reads:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive
and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legis-
lature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participa-
"I Id. at 1353, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (footnote omitted).
21 Id. at 1357, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (footnote omitted).
"I Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974).
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tion in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of the representa-
tion therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 2
The election registrar argued that the disenfrancisement of fel-
ons is expressly exempted from the section two sanction of
reduced representation,23 and that "those who framed and
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended
to prohibit outright in § 1 of that Amendment that which was
expressly exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced repre-
sentation imposed by § 2 of the Amendment.
2 34
In order to determine the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court examined the legislative his-
tory of both the amendment and the reconstruction legislation
passed subsequent to enactment of the amendment. According
to the Supreme Court, the legislative record of the fourteenth
amendment reveals that the equal protection clause was not
intended by its drafters to bar the states from denying the
franchise to ex-felons.235 The Court quoted the statement made
in the House of Representatives by Oregon's Representative
Ephraim Eckley in support of section two of the amendment:
Under a congressional act persons convicted of a crime
against the laws of the United States, the penalty for which
is imprisonment in the penitentiary, are now and always have
been disenfranchised . . . .[S]uppose the mass of the peo-
ple of a State are pirates, counterfeiters, or other criminals,
would gentlemen be willing to repeal the laws now in force in
order to give them an opportunity to land their piratical
crafts and come on shore to assist in the election of a Presi-
dent or members of Congress because they are numerous?3 '
.. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
2 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43 (1974).
"t Id.
2 Id. at 43.52. It is important to note that Richardson v. Ramirez should not be
viewed as indicative of judicial acceptance of the disqualification of ex-offenders in
areas other than voting. The holding was not that disenfranchisement of felons did not
deny equal protection; the holding was that disenfranchisement of felons is specifically
excluded from the protections of the fourteenth amendment. As the Court pointed out,
the amendment contains an express sanction of the state's denial of voting rights to
those convicted of crime. Id. at 54. There is no such sanction for the imposition of any
other disability upon conviction of crime. With regard to occupational opportunities,
therefore, the convicted person is fully protected by the fourteenth amendment. See
section III. C, supra.
2- 418 U.S. at 46, citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2535 (1866).
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Another clue to the intent of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment can be found in Congressional treatment of states
readmitted to the Union after the Civil War. The Reconstruc-
tion Act,237 which established the conditions under which the
former Confederate states would be allowed representation in
Congress, required that each state seeking readmission adopt
a state constitution by a convention. The delegates to such
conventions were to be elected by:
... male citizens. . . twenty-one years old and upward, of
whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have been
resident in said State for one year previous to the day of such
election, except such as may be disenfranchised for participa-
tion in the rebellion or for felony at common law .... "I
In addition, the statutes which readmitted these states to the
Union contained the provision that all males, except those who
were felons, were to be given the right to vote.23 The Supreme
Court considered this to be convincing evidence that the voting
rights of felons were excluded from the protections of the four-
teenth amendment:
2 40
[Tihe exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative
sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .We hold
that the understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment, as reflected in the express language of § 2 and
in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amend-
ment's applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons, is
of controlling significance in distinguishing such laws from
those other state limitations on the franchise which have
been held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause by this
Court . . . . [Section] 1, in dealing with voting rights as it
does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form of
disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the
217 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
211 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428 (Reconstruction Act) cited in
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 49 (1974).
21 Act of June 22, 1868, ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72 (readmitting Arkansas); Act of June
25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73 (readmitting North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Louisiana, Alabama and Florida); Act of January 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62 (readmit-
ting Virginia); Act of Feb. 1, 1870, ch. 12, 16 Stat. 63 (readmitting Mississippi); Act
of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67 (readmitting Texas); Act of March 30, 1870, ch.
39, 16 Stat. 80 (readmitting Georgia).
214 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974).
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less drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 im-
posed for other forms of disenfranchisement.
4'
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Marshall argued that "the
disenfranchisement of ex-felons must be measured against the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of § 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' '242 Rejecting the majority's conclusion
that section two limited the applicability of section one with
regard to felons, he contended that there was no reason for
concluding that the framers of the amendment "intended by §
2 to freeze the meaning of other clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the conception of voting rights prevalent" when
the amendment was adopted.24 3 Quoting the Supreme Court's
own language in Dunn v. Blumstein,2" Justice Marshall wrote:
There is no need to repeat now the labors undertaken in
earlier cases to analyze [the] right to vote and to explain in
detail the judicial role in reviewing state statutes that selec-
tively distribute the franchise. In decision after decision, this
Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis
with other citizens in the jurisdiction.
2
11
According to Marshall, the test that should have been applied
was whether the discriminating statute was "necessary to pro-
mote a compelling state interest. ' 4  He did not feel that the
test had been met:
2 Id. at 54-55. The Supreme Court did not reach the plaintiffs' alternative con-
tention that the lack of uniform interpretation of the California election laws results
in a denial of "geographical" equal protection. That contention had not been ruled
upon by the California court, and the United States Supreme Court held that the state
court should be the forum initially to consider the question. Id. at 55-56. Justices
Marshall and Brennan dissented from the Court's holding on the grounds that the case
was moot and that the constitutional analysis was incorrect because it was based on a
misreading of § 2 of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 56. Justice Douglas dissented
on the basis that he could not say that the California decision did not rest on an
independent state ground. Id. at 86.
22 Id. at 77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 76. Justice Marshall also quoted Dillenbar v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222 (9th
Cir. 1972): "[Clonstitutional concepts of equal protection are not immutably frozen
like insects trapped in Devonian amber." 418 U.S. at 76.
244 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
"I Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 77 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (citations omitted).
2 418 U.S. at 78, citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972). This was
the test applied by the California Supreme Court.
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I think it clear that the State has not met its burden of
justifying the blanket disenfranchisement of former felons
presented by this case. There is certainly no basis for assert-
ing that ex-felons have any less interest in the democratic
process than any other citizen. Like everyone else, their daily
lives are deeply affected and changed by the decisions of
government." '
Justice Marshall also responded to the oft-cited theory
that the disenfranchisement of felons is necessary to prevent
election fraud:
2 8
Although the State has a legitimate and, in fact, compelling
interest in preventing electoral fraud, the challenged provi-
sion is not sustainable on that ground. First, the disenfran-
chisement provisions are patently both overinclusive and
underinclusive. The provision is not limited to those who
have demonstrated a marked propensity for abusing the bal-
lot by violating election laws. Rather, it encompasses all for-
mer felons and there has been no showing that ex-felons gen-
erally are any more likely to abuse the ballot than the re-
mainder of the population . . . .In contrast, many of those
convicted of violating election laws are treated as misde-
meanants and are not barred from voting at all. It seems clear
that the classification here is not tailored to achieve its artic-
ulated goal, since it crudely excludes large numbers of other-
wise qualified voters."9
Justice Marshall's contention that the disenfranchisement
of felons violates equal protection is the statement of a wrong
without a remedy, because, according to the majority opinion,
the fourteenth amendment provides felons with no right to
equal protection in the area of voting rights. Richardson v.
Ramirez holds that the states may distinguish between those
who have been convicted of felonies and those who have not,
and may discriminate against the former by denying them the
ballot.2°
But voting is only one of the rights of political participa-
'' 418 U.S. at 78.
249 See generally Note, 83 YALE L.J., supra note 167.
2,9 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
m Thus, even if one were to succeed in convincing a court that statutes which
deny the franchise to convicted persons are violative of equal protection, a convicted
person could not claim that constitutional protection.
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tion, and disenfranchisement of felons is the only form of dis-
crimination explicitly sanctioned by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Whether disqualification of felons from other modes of
political participation is implicitly sanctioned by the four-
teenth amendment was not answered by Ramirez.
V. EXCLUSION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE
A. Statutory and State Constitutional Bases
The right to hold public office, like the right to vote, has
been restricted in most states since the inception of the na-
tion. 5 ' As one author observed, "the various restrictions frus-
trating popular participation in the political process through-
out our history can be traced, almost without exception, to the
qualifications established in early state constitutions. 2 2 It is
beyond cavil that the state has a valid interest in excluding
from public "office those who would impair efficiency and hon-
esty in government operations, ' 53 and, according to the courts,
the laws which prohibit felons from holding public office are
intended to protect the public from what has been called the
"inherent danger to the body politic that a criminal may
exercise the powers of government.
2 4
Early state constitutions and statutes restricted public off-
ice to those who met certain conditions based upon property
ownership, religion, sex, age, race and other criteria.2 5 Today,
although many of these conditions have been eliminated, most
states continue to restrict the right to be a candidate and the
right to hold public office to persons who have not been con-
victed of a serious crime.2' The person convicted of a disquali-
25 See generally Le Clercq, supra note 167. Professor Le Clercq notes that both
voting and candidacy were restricted by provisions in early state constitutions and
statutes. Id. at 608-14.
151 Id. at 609.
2 United States v. Warden of Walkill Prison, 246 F. Supp. 72, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
afl'd, 355 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1966).
2' Matsen v. Kaiser, 443 P.2d 843, 845 (Wash. 1968).
2 See generally Le Clercq, supra note 167, at 608-14.
2' See Special Project, supra note 5, at 987-1001. See also State v. Haubrich, 83
N.W.2d 451 (Iowa 1957). The states can dictate qualifications for holding state or
municipal offices, but they may not dictate the qualifications for federal offices, be-
cause the latter are set forth in the United States Constitution and laws of the United
States. In re O'Connor, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1940). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (qualifica-
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fying crime, 2 7 which may be anything from murder to the ille-
gal sale of ducks, 58 will find himself excluded from a number
of public offices. 59
What constitutes a disqualifying crime varies from one
jurisdiction to another.2 16 Evidence that a person has been con-
victed of a felony can establish a "prima facie case" that the
person is ineligible to hold public office.21 Another court ruled
that "conviction of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime
should ipso facto, render a person ineligible to hold any public
office. ' 2 2 The Kentucky Constitution states: "All persons shall
be excluded from office who have been, or shall hereafter be,
convicted of a felony, or of such high misdemeanor as shall be
prescribed by law. .... ,,2*" In Georgia, conviction of a "felony
involving moral turpitude" will result in exclusion from public
office, 264 while in Arkansas conviction of an "infamous crime"
has the same effect.
265
tions of Representatives), § 3 (qualifications of Senators), § 5 (expulsion of Representa-
tives or Senators); art. II, § 1 (qualifications of President & Vice-President), § 4
(removal of President, Vice-President, & civil officers). The Constitution does not
exclude felons from holding federal office, although the fourteenth amendment ex-
cludes certain persons convicted of rebellion. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
21 In general, conviction of a disqualifying crime in a criminal proceeding is re-
quired to exclude a person from holding public office. The mere determination of guilt
in a civil proceeding is usually not sufficient. Lovely v. Cockrell, 35 S.W.2d 891, 892
(Ky. 1931).
21 See, e.g., State ex rel. Payne v. Irion, 113 So. 360 (La. 1927). See also Special
Project, supra note 5, at 991-94.
21 What constitutes a public office is construed very broadly. According to the
Sixth Circuit, "an office is the right to exercise public employment and to take fees or
emoluments thereunto belonging." Pope v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 1006, 1009 (6th
Cir. 1943). This definition generally includes everyone elected or appointed to dis-
charge a public duty.
211 See Special Project, supra note 5, at 989-97.
"I, Hogan v. Hartwell, 7 So.2d 889, 890 (Ala. 1942).
122 Illinois ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 150 N.E.2d 168, 174 (Il1. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 828 (1958).
23 Ky. CONST. § 150. This constitutional mandate has, at times, prevented elected
representatives of the people from holding office. For example, in City of Pineville v.
Collett, 172 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1943), a city clerk who was convicted of manslaughter
was required to surrender to the city everything relating to the office to which he had
been elected. The Kentucky Court of Appeals suggested that the office of clerk could
be filled temporarily by the city, pending the convicted clerk's appeal. If affirmed, the
conviction would permanently disqualify the clerk from holding any public office in
Kentucky. Id. at 642.
2-4 GA. CODE ANN. § 89-101(3)(1972).
2' ARK. CONsT. art. 5, § 9.
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A crime which may exclude a person from public office in
one state may not result in such exclusion in another state."'
For example, in Commonwealth v. Shauer,67 the conviction of
a sheriff on charges of bribing a voter before the sheriffs elec-
tion to office did not disqualify him under the laws of Pennsyl-
vania. Had the locus been Kentucky, however, the conviction
would have disqualified the sheriff from holding office. 6 '
In general, the conviction of a public official results in the
office being automatically vacated, with no need for further
hearings." 9 For those instances in which the applicable statute
prescribes disqualification only upon conviction of certain
types of crimes, e.g., crimes involving moral turpitude, or high
misdemeanors, a hearing may be required to determine if the
crime of which the person has been convicted is a crime which
falls within the disqualification.270
The two model acts dealing with exclusion from public
office handle the problem in two very different ways. The Uni-
form Act on the Status of Convicted Persons2' is the more
liberal, providing that a convicted person shall be ineligible to
hold public office only from the time of conviction and sentenc-
ing to the time of final discharge. 72 The Model Penal Code, on
the other hand, provides that:
A person holding any public office who is convicted of a crime
shall forfeit his office if:
(1) he is convicted under the laws of this State of a felony
or under laws of another jurisdiction of a crime, which, if
committed within this State, would be a felony; or
(2) he is convicted of a crime involving malfeasance in such
office, or dishonesty; or
:' See generally Special Project, supra note 5, at 989-97.
3 W. & S. 338 (Pa. 1842).
" See Lovely v. Cockrell, 35 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1931).
' See State ex rel. Salisbury v. Vogel, 256 N.W. 404, 407 (N.D. 1934). Due process
is satisfied by the hearing which is afforded in the criminal proceeding.
"0 In one instance, a hearing was required to determine if the crime of conspiracy
to demand and receive a sum of money for favorable consideration of a zoning variance
involved moral turpitude. Galloway v. Township of Clark, 223 A.2d 644 (N.J. 1966).
2, UNIFORM ACT ON THE STATUS OF CONVITED PERSONS § 2.
272 Adoption of the Uniform Act is hampered in many states by constitutional
provisions that would require amendment prior to implementation of the Act. Only
two states, Hawaii and New Hampshire, have adopted the Uniform Act, although
Minnesota has a substantially similar act. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, 951c (1974).
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(3) the Constitution or a state statute other than the Code
so provides.
173
Subsection 3 of this provision incorporates by reference all
other laws of the state on exclusion from office. Thus, in ess-
ence the Model Penal Code merely adds disqualifications for
dishonesty and malfeasance in office, which many state stat-
utes do not now contain.
274
B. Federal Constitutional Questions
The states have inherent power to establish the qualifica-
tions for public offices and to impose the conditions and limita-
tions under which such officials serve. 275 Thus, the states may
exclude from public office those who have been convicted of
crime, so long as the exclusion is not violative of the Federal
Constitution. Although the Constitution provides for the ten-
ure of a few federal officers, establishes the terms of their off-
ices, and prescribes the procedures required to remove those
officers,7 it is silent as to whether citizens have a right to be
candidates for and to hold public office.277
It has been argued that once a public office is attained, it
is, or should have the qualities of, a property right. 5 If the
right to hold public office is considered a property right, the
constitutional protections against the government's taking of
property apply. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the holder of a public office has no vested property right in the
2" Model Penal Code § 306.2 (proposed final draft, 1962).
2" See Special Project, supra note 5, at 989-97.
" French v. Senate, 80 P. 1031, 1033 (Cal. 1905). In the federal realm, Congress
has the power to provide for the removal of inferior officers. See, e.g., Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926).
218 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 5; art. II, § 1; amend. XIV.
m Despite the fact that candidacy was traditionally viewed as a state right, be-
yond federal constitutional protection. See generally Le Clercq, supra note 167, at 615-
18, there are constitutional limitations. The Supreme Court has held that "[nlo
[S]tate can pass a law regulating elections that violates the Fourteenth
[Amendment]. ... Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968).
21 Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535 (1939); Sanchez v. United States,
216 U.S. 167 (1910); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Crenshaw v. United
States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890); Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227 (1880); State ex rel.
Nagle v. Sullivan, 40 P.2d 995 (Mont. 1935).
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office"  and that, therefore, the due process clauses of the Con-
stitution have no application .2s
Despite the apparent inapplicability of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, it is possible that the
equal protection clause offers its protection to those who are
excluded from public office on the basis of a criminal convic-
tion. Even though the Supreme Court held in Richardson v.
Ramire25' that section two of the fourteenth amendment ex-
pressly excludes the voting rights of felons from the protections
of section one, there is no provision in the fourteenth amend-
ment which would allow discrimination against felons in the
area of eligibility for public office. 2
In attempting to determine whether a state regulatory
scheme which discriminates among groups is violative of equal
protection, it is necessary to consider the nature of the state's
interest and the impact of the discrimination on the individ-
ual.23 The interest of the state must be valid and the discrimi-
nation must rationally serve that interest.284 Furthermore, if a
suspect classification or a fundamental right is involved, the
state must show that the discrimination is necessary to further
a compelling state interest,25 that the statute is "tailored" with
"I Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548
(1900).
-1 Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900). Although there is no property right in
a public office, such a right may be hypothesized in controversies among persons
claiming the office; that is, however, merely a device of judicial convenience and not
an inherent right of any of the parties.
211 418 U.S. 24 (1974). See section IV B, supra.
Z Section three of the fourteenth amendment does, however, disqualify certain
individuals:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as
a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member
of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in in-
surrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the ene-
mies thereoL But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House remove
such disability.
On its face, this section does not apply to felons other than those who have engaged in
treasonous or rebellious acts after taking an oath as a federal or state official.
2 See generally B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, 285-94 (1972). See also, e.g.,
Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916).
, See, e.g., Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 578 (1938).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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"precision"28 8 to achieve the state goal, and that there is no
"less drastic means""2 7 of achieving the goal.
Three criteria are used to determine whether a group
constitutes a suspect classification: 8 ' "(1) [T]he discreteness
and insularity of the minority, (2) its susceptibility to stigma-
tization, and (3) the immutability of the characteristics by
which the class is identified."2 9 It has been argued that ex-
offenders have all the hallmarks of a suspect classification:
First, the convict is part of a discrete and insular minority
which is politically impotent. Second, he is quite susceptible
to stigmatization, to which his difficulty in reentering so-
ciety, especially as an employee, attests. And finally, the
status of being a convict is immutable in the same way one's
natural origin has been deemed an immutable characteristic
creating a suspect classification .... "I
If ex-offenders do in fact constitute a suspect classification, the
statutes which exclude them from public office are phrased in
such broad language that they do not seem to be "tailored"
with the necessary "precision"2 '' in pursuing the state goal of
protecting the public from those who would use the power of a
public office for criminal objectives. In addition, an individual-
ized determination of whether the ex-offender in question
would pose a threat to the public welfare if appointed or elected
to public office would be a "less drastic means" '92 of achieving
the state goal.
Even if ex-offenders are not found to constitute a suspect
classification, however, the validity of laws which exclude them
from public office may fail the test of constitutionality, since
it may be that their exclusion from public office does not ra-
tionally further the state's interest in preserving the integrity
'6 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
' Id., quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
2 The Supreme Court has never held that ex-offenders constitute a suspect clas-
sification, but a lower federal court held that felons do not constitute a suspect classifi-
cation. Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1190 (1st Cir. 1970).
21 Note, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REV. supra note 73, at 305-06 (citations omitted).
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
22 Id. 333-34.
I" Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
912 Id., quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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of public office.293 Moreover, the state's interest in rehabilitat-
ing its convicted citizens is actually thwarted by the exclusion.
According to the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals:
[Tbo reintegrate an offender into free society, the offender
must retain all attributes of citizenship. In addition, his re-
spect for law and the legal system may well depend, in some
measure, on his ability to participate in that system. Manda-
tory denials of that participation serve no legitimate public
interest."4
VI. CONCLUSION
The origins of state imposed disabilities for conviction of
crime are obscured by the mists of antiquity. They have
changed over the centuries, becoming less brutal but in many
ways more pervasive. In modem America these disabilities en-
sure that the ex-offender is set apart as something less than his
fellow citizens. Their application has been accompanied, in
many cases, by irrationality and inconsistency.
The most fundamental of political rights, the right to vote,
is removed from the realm of fourteenth amendment protec-
tions, where ex-offenders are concerned, by Richardson v.
Ramirez.295 In the area of occupational disabilities, a wide
range of employment opportunities are currently closed to ex-
offenders, although Harris v. Kentucky Board of Barbering
26
indicates that the courts are receptive to due process and equal
protection attacks on such statutes, especially if the disqualifi-
cations are applied with a broad brush or are written in the
conclusive terms of an irrebuttable presumption.
Evaluation of these laws, however, should not be confined
to piecemeal challenges in the courts. It is time for Congress
and the legislatures of the various states to reexamine the mer-
its of civil disabilities. How important is it to the protection of
the patrons of barbers, or even the clients of lawyers, that the
21 See Special Project, supra note 5, at 1175-77; notes 139-46 and accompanying
text, supra.
24 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
CORRECTIONS, Standard 16.17 at 592 (1973)[hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS].
, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
, 5 Civil No. C 74-399 L(A) (W.D. Ky., June 13, 1975).
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licensed expert whom they consult should never have trans-
gressed the laws of the state? In light of the comprehensive
election laws which now abound, providing intricate safeguards
and serious penalties, how much of a threat to the ballot box
does an ex-offender pose?
These questions are especially appropriate when one looks
at the other side of the coin-the effect on the offender. Such
stringent restrictions severely hinder, if not foreclose, an ex-
offender's attempts to rejoin society. As Chief Justice Burger
has written: "Society has a stake in whatever may be the
chance of restoring [the offender] to normal and useful life
within the law." '297 Yet the state, after exacting the penalty
prescribed by law, denies the ex-offender the means by which
he might follow a "normal and useful life." Depriving the ex-
offender of the political rights usually attendant upon citizen-
ship hampers his efforts at reformation and may diminish his
respect for a system in which he is not allowed to participate. 21
Far more serious, however, are the barriers he encounters in his
efforts to enter into gainful and decent employment. "The abil-
ity of the offender to earn a livelihood may well determine his
success in rejecting a life of crime. By precluding his participa-
tion in the growing number of government-regulated occupa-
tions, his readjustment is made much more difficult." 299 Unem-
ployment may be one of the primary factors in the high rate of
recidivism,"' and the large number of regulated occupations
which are closed to the ex-offender can only contribute to in-
creased unemployment.
The ex-offender, having paid his debt to society by serving
his sentence, leaves prison only to find himself a second-class
citizen. No matter how far along the road to rehabilitation he
may have traveled, no matter how sincere he may be in his
desire to live up to society's expectations, the state often denies
him the chance to demonstrate his usefulness, either to himself
or to society. Such arbitrary treatment can have only an ad-
21 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
2" CORRECTONS, supra note 294, Standard 16.17 at 593.
ng Id.
Stacy, Limitations on Denying Licensure to Ex-Offenders, 2 CAP. U.L. REv. 1,
3 (1973).
[Vol. 64
1975] CIVIL DISABILITIES OF Ex-OFFENDERS 431
verse effect on the rehabilitative effort. For these reasons it has
been urged that, unless there is a direct and present relation-
ship between the offense committed or the characteristics of
the offender and the license or privilege sought, all provisions
which deprive ex-offenders of civil rights and occupational op-
portunities should be repealed. ' We concur.
Walter W. May
Larry F. Sword
9, CORRECTIONS, supra note 294, Standard 16.17 at 592. See also ROSCOE POUND
AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFER-
ENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES, A PROGRAM FOR PRISON REFORM: THE FINAL
REPORT 16 (1972).
